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RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES-PAYMENTs-RIGHT TO RECOVER.-ISAACS V. KOBRE,
145 N. Y. S., 919.-Defendant purchased a note on June third, which was
payable on May third of the same year. The note being unpaid, defend-
ant informed plaintiff, an indorser, that the note was payable on June
third, the day of the purchase. As both parties labored under a mutual
mistake, the plaintiff paid the note, but on receiving it discovered the mis-
take. Held, as the plaintiff had been discharged of his liability by the
failure of the holder to protest it when not paid when due, the plaintiff
might recover his payment.
Where the indorser paid a check without knowledge of the facts
which discharged him from all liability, he may recover the money so
paid. Martin v. Campbell, 160 N. Y. 190. If an indorser of a note rely-
ing upon a notice received from a notary public that the note has been
dishonored, and being called upon to pay the note, when in fact a proper
demand has not been made upon the maker, such payment is made under
a mistake of fact and the money so paid may be recovered. Talbot v. Na-
tional Bank of Commonwealth, 129 Mass. 67.
COURTS-OPINIoNs-"DIcTuM.'-DuNcAN v. BROWN, 139 PAC. (N.
M.) 140.-Held, wherever a question fairly arises in the course of a trial.
and there is a distinct decision of such question, the ruling of the court in
respect thereto cannot be called mere dictum.
Remarks in an opinion, not necessary to the decision of the case, are
dicta, and have no binding force. In re Klock, 51 N. Y. S. 879, a judicial
opinion on a point not necessary to the decision of the question before the
court is dictum, and has no binding force. People v. Leubischer, 54 N. Y.
S. 869. The determination of a matter which is involved in the litigation
and discussed at the bar is not mere dictum, even though it is only indi-
rectly involved in the discussion of the question on which the case turns.
Lancaster County v. McDonald, 73 Neb. 453. Every proposition of.law
enunciated, if actually involved in the facts is to be taken as a principal of
law stare decisis. Maddox v. U. S., 5 Ct. Cl. 372.
FRAUDS-STATUTE OF-PARTY TO BE CHARGED.-KAISER V. JONES, 163 S.
W. (Ky).-Plaintiff contracted to sell land to the defendant but the de-
fendant alone signed the contract and the vendor sued for damages for
the breach. Held, that the words "the party to be charged" in the statute
of frauds means the vendor, and if the vendee alone has signed no action
can be maintained on the contract.
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In practically all the states the words "the party to be charged"
have been interpreted to mean the defendant in the action, whether he is
the vendor or the vendee. Heflin v. Milton, 69 Ala. 354; Hodges v.
Kowling, 58 Conn. 12; Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray, 25; Simuzes
v. Killian, 34 N. C. 252. But in Kentucky and Tennessee it has always
been held that the agreement of the plaintiff who hasn't signed, not being
binding, forms no consideration for the promise of the defendant and
there is a want of mutuality which can only be avoided by interpreting the
words "party to be charged" to mean the vendor. City of Murray v.
Crawford, 138 Ky. 25; Usher v. Flood, 83 Ky, 552; Frazer v. Ford, 2
Head (Tenn.) 464. And where the vendor hasn't signed, the bringing of
the action doesn't remedy the defect. Frazer v. Ford, sutpra. For the same
reason New York, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania,
and Texas have thought it necessary to change their statutes to read
"grantor or lessor" instead of "party to be charged." All these states
proceed on the theory that the purpose of the statute is to protect the
holders of title to realty rather than the vendee. City of Murray v. Craw-
ford, supra. But the great majority of the states hold that the vendee is
to be equally protected because there is as much danger of an exorbitant
price being imposed on him by perjury as there is of a contract to sell
being similarly imposed on the owner of the land. Simines v. Killian,
supra; Harper v. Goldschmidt, 156 Cal. 245. So the holding of the princi-
pal case and the reasoning upon which it is based are contrary to the
great weight of authority, but in accord with the precedents of their
own state and Tennessee.
LIMITATIONS OF AcTIoNs-OBSTRUCTION OF WATER COURSE.-TAYLOR V.
NEWMAN, et 1. 139 P. (KAN.) 369.-In an action for trespass to real prop-
erty, where the defendant had built and maintained a permanent obstruc-
tion in the channel of a stream which had for two years prior to this ac-
tion so diverted the flow of water so as to cause the plaintiff's land on the
opposite shore to be carried away, it was held that the cause of action
was barred by.the two-year statute of limitations.
There is perhaps no subject in the law about which there is greater
conflict than the application of the statute of limitations to these cases.
Board of Directors of St. Francis Lev. Dist. v. Barton, 92 Ark. 406. The
weight of authority, however, seems to be that where the nuisance is of a
permanent character and its continuance is necessarily an injury, the dam-
age is original, may be fully compensated for in one action, and the statute
begins to run from the time the structure is erected. Board of Dir. St.
Francis Lev. Dist. v. Barton, supra; Parker v. Atchison, 58 Kan. 29; St.
Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Morris, 35 Ark. 622. This was held even where
the injury was at irregular intervals. Gulf, C. & S. R. Co. v. Mosely, 161
Fed. 72. But where the full extent of the injury cannot be foreseen at the
time the obstruction is erected, the statute doesn't begin to run until the
injury is apparent and then the whole recovery must be had in one action.
Buntin v. Chicago, R. I. & R. R. Co., 41 Fed. 774. Yet in a few cases
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where the defendant's act may or may not cause injury, a recovery was
allowed for each separate injury. Troy v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 23 N. H. 83.
An extreme view is taken by some courts which hold that even where the
obstruction is permanent and the injury must necessarily follow, each con-
tinuance is a new injury and damages may be recovered in successive ac-
tions until the prescriptive period has run. Prime v. Yonkers, 131 N. Y.
App. Div. 110; Valley R. Co. v. Franz, 43 Ohio St. 623; Daneri v. Southern
Cal. R. Co., 122 Cal. 507. Farnham on "Water and Water Courses", Vol. 2,
Sec. 506, disapproves of the above rule and says it has no application to
cases of permanent obstructions, but that the statute should run from the
time of the erection and the time the injury is done. This is the majority
rule with which the principal case is in accord.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ScOPE OF EMPLOYENT.-KEmp v. CHIcAGo R.
I. & P. RY Co., 138 PAciFic REPORTER, 621.-An employer may be held
liable for the wrongful acts of his employee done in the scope of his em-
ployment. While it is difficult to define this expression with precision, as
applied to all situations ,it may be said generally, that to fix liability upon
the employer the act must not only be done in the time but in pursuance of
the object of and in furtherance of duty. If done solely to accomplish an em-
ployee's own purpose or device, although in an interval of his regular
service, the employer is not liable. Benson, Mason and West JJ., dissent-
ing.
This court held there was no question for the jury as to the brake-
man's acting within the scope of his employment, when, after he had
ordered away trespassers and they had called back an insult to him after
they had reached some distance in flight, he pursued and shot one of them.
In general the master is not liable for the acts of the servant unless
they are in the course of his employment, Haler v. Ross, 68 N. J. L. 324;
Lima Ry. v. Little, 67 Ohio St. 91, though this phase is not synonymous
with, "during time of employment." The scope of duty is to be implied
from the nature of the employment, Ephland v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 137 Mo. 187,
which in this case clearly included the duty of expelling trespassers. To
escape liabliity the master must show the servant had gone about some
purpose of his own, Barmore v. Vicksburg, 85 Miss. 426. In the opinion
of the majority of the court the brakeman's action here was so plainly
retaliatory that they held in accord with Barmore v. Vicksburg as matter
of law. In a similar case, Lytle v. Crescent News Co., 27 Tex. Civil Ap-
peals, 530, a master was held not liable when his agent shot a man who
called him a vile name. Several cases have held there is no liability upon
a master when his watchman shoots a trespasser, Sandles v. Levenson,
176N. Y. 610; Bel# Co. v. Banicki, 102 IIl. App. 642. Since, in the prin-
cipal case, there was no pursuit by the brakeman until he was insulted, it
would seem as though there were here no question of fact to be decided
and that the court rightly passed upon the case as a question of law.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-FRIGHTENING HORSES-STREETS.-STKES
V. SAC CrrY, 144 N. W. (IowA) 639.-Defendant allowed a third party to
exhibit within the limits of the public highway, an animal confined in a
cage. Plaintiff's horse became frightened at the cage, ran away causing
injuries to the plaintiff. Held, the city was liable in damages to the plain-
tiff for the injuries caused by the horse becoming frightened at the ob-
struction in the highway.
By the weight of authority, objects within the limits of a highway
naturally calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness may consti-
tute such deficiencies in the way as to render the town liable, even though
so far removed from the traveled path as to avoid all danger of collis-
ion. Foshay v. Town of Glenhaven, 28W is., 288; Morse v. Richmond, 41
Vt. 435; Newison v. New Haven, 7 Am. Law Reg. 83. In Massachusetts
the rule appears to be that the mere fright of a horse at an obstacle in the
highway which results in injury is not sufficient to hold the town liable,
though the object was of a character naturally calculated to frighten
horses. Cook v. Charleston, 98 Mass. 80; Bowes v. Boston, 155 Mass. 334;
Champlin v. Village of Pen Yan, 34 Hun. 33; a dead animal lying in the
street, Chicago v. Hay, 75 Ill. 530; a pig sty containing pigs, Bartlett v.
Hooksett, 48 N. H. 18, have been held to be objects naturally calculated to
frighten horses. But lumber piled-temporarily in the highway, Chamber-
lin v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356, and a steam roller used in repairing streets,
McMulkin v. Chicago, 92 Ill. App. 331; building material temporarily
placed upon a portion of the street, Loberg v. Amherst, 87 Wis. 634, have
been held to be objects not naturally calculated to frighten horses. The
liability of the town rests primarily upon whether the use to which the
highway was put was reasonable and necessary for travel and the inci-
dents of travel or whether the highway was allowed to be used as a
place of business, storehouse, or some other purpose for which the high-
way was not primarily laid out. If the latter, the town should be respon-
sible.
NEW TRLAL-FAILuRE TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS.-LINITZKY v. GoR-
MAN, 146 N. Y, SUP., 313-Held, where plaintiff, in a malicious prosecu-
tion did not request a charge that, under the uncontroverted evidence, he
was entitled to substantial damages, the court cannot, on motion, set a ver-
dict for him for nominal damages, though he was entitled, as a matter of
law, to substantial damages.
The general rule is that a question of law available, but not
raised at the trial, cannot be raised on motion for a new trial.
Holdsworth v. Tucker, 147 Mass., 572; Beali v. Beals, 20 Ind., 163.
In St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Werner, 70 Kan., 190. it was
held, an erroneous instruction, not excepted to, is not ground for a new
trial. In some cases, however, where there has been positive error in the
charge, a new trial has been granted, though the instruction was not ex-
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cepted to. Nulton v. Croskey, 111 Mo. App., 18; McCann v. UlIman, 109
Wis., 574; Lochrane v. Solomon, 38 Ga., 286. In Brigden v. Osmun, 36
N. Y. S., 1025, a new trial was allowed where an instruction was given
based on a misapprehension of testimony, though no request was made or
exception taken, and in Moore v. Balten, 5 Misc. (N. Y.), 520, the broad
rule was laid down that a court may allow a new trial, in its discretion,
for failure to give proper instructions, though no request was made. How-
ever, Freeland v. Southern Ry. Co., 70 S. C., 427, a case very similar in its
facts to Linitzky v. Gorman, held in accord with the principal case, the
rule of which seems to be well established. Although the rule undoubtedly
works hardships in some instances, as in the principal case, where it led
to the denial of a clear legal right, adherence to it leads to uniformity and
certainty in procedure, and a less stringent rule, it may be argued, would
cause subterfuge and delay.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-SERVICES RENDERED INl EMERGENCY-RIGHT
TO COMPENSATION.-SCHOENBERG V. ROSE, 145 N. Y. S., 831.-The president
and secretary of a corporation were, during the pendency of a trial against
a corporation, in a court room, when the president became suddenly ill and
fell unconscious on the floor. The secretary and counsel for the corpora-
tion called for a doctor, whereupon the plaintiff, who was in the court
room, responded and rendered medical assistance. Held, that the fact that
the secretary and counsel summoned plaintiff did not render them liable
for the service, since they, being under no legal obligation to furnish medi-
cal services to the deceased, occupied the relation of mere strangers.
When a person calls a physician to care for another rendered by sud-
den injury unable to act for himself and to whom he stands in no rela-
tionship which, creates any obligation to furnish necessary medical care,
and no express undertaking is entered into, the law does not presume from
the mere summoning of the physician and requesting him to care for the
injured, any implied promise to pay for the services. Starrett v. Miley, 79
Ill. App., 658; Dorion v. Jacobson, 113 Ill. App., 653. One is not under any
implied obligation to pay for the services of a physician called to attend
a minor living with his family and supported by him, but not otherwise
relator to him, though he acquiesced in the attendance. Holnes v. McKim,
109 Iowa, 245; Raukin v. Beale, 68 Mo. App., 32. The rule appears to be
that if the party summoning the physician is under only a moral obligation
to the party needing the medical aid, and there is no express promise to
pay the physician, the party summoning the physician is not liable for the
services.
RELIGEOUS SOCIETIES-RIGHTS OF PEWHOLDERS.-WITTHAUS V. ST.
THO aAS' CHURCH, 146 N. Y. S., 279.-Held, a pewholder has no title to
the church edifice nor to the soil, but possesses only a usufructuary right
to the use of the pew when the building is open for services, subject to the
reasonable regulations of the church.
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A pewholder's right is only a right to occupy his pew during public
worship. First Presbyterian Society of Antrimn v. Bass, 68 N. H., 333;
Daniel v. Wood, 18 Mass., 102. It is a qualified ownership subject to the
superior title included in the ownership of the house. Colby v. Society,
63 N. H., 63. A parish or corporation is the sole owner of the soil on
which the meeting house stands. The pewowner does not own the soil
over which the pew is built. Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass., 435. The decision on
both principle and authority is clearly sound.
